Stop dancing like
Chapter 1. Once
Quitetly, Quiggly
We've recently dis
That turned dark q
Chapter 1. Once
Tiffany, you reall
Release me. Now. O
FTL is not possibl
Release me. Now. ORelease me. Now. Or I
will do it for you.”
In response, a security officer told her that if she did not calm down she would
have to find herself a new attorney.
As they continued to argue, she continued to curse and threaten everyone in
the room and called the deputy and assistant chief officers who had come to secure
the room “assholes” and “fucking idiots.” One of the officers who had come to
secure the room moved her from the table to a chair.
After being seated in a chair, Gaston threw some file folders on the floor in an
apparent attempt to injure Officer Lopez. Lopez tried to regain control of Gaston
and her chair, but Gaston struck Lopez on the left hand. Officer Lopez told
Gaston she had been cut. Lopez then requested that she be transferred to the
booking area so that her hand could be treated.
While another officer was helping her walk, Gaston told him, “Don’t touch me,
you fucking pig” and hit him with her purse. After being put into a wheelchair,
Gaston kicked her chair into a wall, spitting and cursing loudly. Gaston was
then taken to a medical area so she could be treated.
In the meantime, Lopez told Sergeant Moulton she could handle Gaston
herself and she did not need to go to the emergency room. Gaston was then
walked to the nurses’ station. It is at this point that the videotape ends.
The next day, Gaston filed an inmate grievance about the incident. She
alleged that she was hit by her chair but she did not complain of any injuries.
After receiving medical treatment and treatment for a cut on the finger she
had split open, Gaston was returned to the county jail. She was charged with
assaulting a county jail officer, an offense for which she was convicted after a
bench trial.1 She was also charged with battery to an inmate, a state jail felony.2
1
2
§§ 38.03 and 45.11(a).
The trial court convicted Gaston of the charged offenses and assessed a $3,000 fine. The trial court then sentenced her to three years’ imprisonment, probated for four years, a $500 fine, and thirty days in jail.
On appeal, Gaston challenges only the trial court’s imposition of community
supervision.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Community Supervision
Trial courts have broad discretion to determine the conditions of community
supervision.3 When the conditions imposed are challenged, the appellate court
will review the record in its entirety, applying an abuse of discretion standard of
review.4 A trial court abuses its discretion when the conditions are not reasonable
and they have “such an effect on the probationer’s liberty and reputation that they
may be quite significant and for that reason he or she is being put on ‘short
leash.’”5
B.
Requiring Drug Testing
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that after a finding of guilt, a trial
court may suspend a defendant’s sentence and place the defendant on community
supervision.6 The Code also requires, however, that the trial court require a
defendant to submit to drug tests as a condition of community supervision.7
This means that once a trial court determines a defendant should be placed on
community supervision, it has no discretion but to impose whatever conditions it
determines to be reasonably related to the defendant’s rehabilitation and his
abiding by the law.8 An order requiring submission to drug testing is not an
abuse of discretion as long as there is evidence in the record that connects the
defendant to drug usage.9 This is particularly true in this case where Gaston was
convicted of a crime related to narcotics use.
C.
Evidentiary Review
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision to revoke community
supervision for an abuse of discretion.10 In conducting its review, the court
reviews the evidence presented at the revocation proceeding in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s order.11
1.
Improper Fact Finding
A trial court abuses its discretion if it permits the fact finder to make an inference
of guilt from an inference of illegal conduct.12 Thus, a finding that “the defendant
was reasonably believed to have committed an offense, even if that offense was not
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is evidence from which the trial court may
infer that the defendant violated a condition of his community supervision.”13
When a defendant’s guilt for an offense which gives rise to a condition of community
supervision is contested, however, the inference that the defendant committed the
offense cannot be inferred from a finding that the defendant violated a condition of
his community supervision.14 This is because a finding that a defendant violated the
conditions of his community supervision cannot establish guilt for an offense for
which there has been no trial.15
Because of this limitation, courts of appeals have held that once the
defendant raises the issue of the alleged conduct, it is the State’s burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of that conduct if the defendant’s
guilt for the crime that gave rise to the conditions is contested.16 In holding this,
the court of appeals recognized that the State is not required to meet the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt when it seeks the revocation of a defendant’s
probation.17 Similarly, this Court has held that it is within the trial court’s
discretion to revoke a defendant’s community supervision for a violation of the
conditions, even if the community supervision was not proven to be improper.18
2.
Findings Based on Improper Presumptions
Having reviewed the record in its entirety, the court of appeals held that the
trial court abused its discretion because its finding that Gaston committed the
offense was not supported by the evidence.19 The court of appeals could not find
that the trial court’s finding was reasonably supported by the record because the
trial court admitted into evidence Gaston’s video statement without requiring
the State to authenticate it, Gaston never denied using narcotics, and Gaston
never presented witnesses or other evidence that would have cast doubt on the
State’s allegation that she violated the terms of her community supervision by
failing a drug test.20
After stating that “Gaston offered no evidence that would cast doubt on whether
she used the drug-test stick,” the court of appeals held that the trial court
therefore concluded that “Gaston was dishonest when she denied drug use to her
community supervision officer.”21 The court of appeals held this violated Gaston’s
due process rights and violated rule 804 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.22 We agree.
2.
Proper Legal and Factual Findings
The trial court heard testimony from Gaston that she tested positive for cocaine
use and that her community supervision officer told her that she tested positive
for cocaine. The trial court also heard testimony that Gaston refused to take a
drug test. The trial court was, thus, in a position to determine whether Gaston
violated the terms of her community supervision by failing a drug test. The trial
court expressly stated that it found this allegation to be true. It also ordered her
community supervision “suspended” based on this finding.
We agree with the State that Gaston is bound by her affirmative plea of “true”
to the charged violation of the conditions of her community supervision. In
Pitonyak v. State,23 we held that where there is a plea of true, the accused is
estopped from complaining on appeal that the evidence presented failed to establish
his guilt.24 Because Gaston freely, knowingly, and voluntarily pleaded “true” to the
violated condition of her community supervision, we agree with the State that
Gaston is estopped from challenging on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting this determination.25
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the court of appeals that the trial court
abused its discretion by ordering community supervision revoked based on
insufficient evidence.26
3.
Imposition of Illegal Sentence
We must now determine whether the court of appeals properly determined that
Gaston’s sentence must be vacated.27 The State argues that Gaston has waived her
complaint by failing to object at the punishment phase of her trial. We do not agree
that Gaston has waived her complaint. The court of appeals reviewed Gaston’s
sentence and found that it exceeded the statutory maximum.28
It is true that a trial judge’s actions generally may not be challenged for the
first time on appeal,29 but even though Gaston waived her right to a jury trial, the
punishment phase of her trial occurred