Fear of the Unknown: The Influence of Uncertainty on Anticipated Judgments About Risky Technologies" presented to the Association of Risk Analysis Groups, Boston, MA. (2008) [9] The only two instances where the term "regulatory" is used in the document are in the sentence "We recommend that the Department of Energy select two representatives from this subcommittee to serve on a national, multidisciplinary federal regulatory council" and in a sentence stating "[T]he committee would like to recommend a strong, effective, and independent OST [Office of Science and Technology] program to strengthen U.S. research capability in the fields of biotechnology and nanotechnology" (emphasis added). The rest of the report is devoted to the topic of "Biosecurity", a term which does not connote a regulatory program. [10] Cf. Bureker v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs., 423 F.Supp.2d 81, 83 (D.D.C.2006) ("If the statutory text is unambiguous, no further inquiry is required."). [11] It is also noted that the GAO report was issued after a two day hearing which was attended by over a dozen industry representatives. [12] Congress was specifically concerned with the potential of terrorists' obtaining weapons of mass destruction as well as bio-threats. See discussion of the "War on Terror" and the threat of weapons of mass destruction in "Nuclear Warheads at Work and Play." [13] A number of reports and studies of the Bush administration have concluded that there has been an "intelligence failure" with regard to bioterrorism. See, e.g., "Misreading the Bioterrorist Threat: The Intelligence Community's Failure to Anticipate the Sept. 11 Attacks," Report by the Congressional Research Service, August 27, 2005, p. 1. [14] See "Biological Threats: National Response and Private/Public Partnerships," a report commissioned by DARPA, the Pentagon's "Big Daddy" of Biosecurity research. [15] The DARPA Report notes that "[l]imited progress [has been made] in developing protective medical countermeasures" but adds that the United States "remains significantly behind the Russians and other countries in the development of antiviral agents that might be deployed against novel and highly infectious microorganisms." The DARPA Report also notes, however, that in "early 2001, FDA granted an emergency IND for a monoclonal antibody for protection against inhalational anthrax, and the monoclonal antibody recently received approval." The DARPA Report therefore suggests that "[t]he federal government is increasingly investing in research and development for such an approach to biosecurity." The report further notes, however, that "there are no FDA approved drugs for any of the pathogens of greatest concern," i.e., Marburg, Ebola and SARS. [16] It should be noted that one of the reasons that a private sector R&D venture was launched for the purpose of developing countermeasures was that the existing FDA-approved countermeasures lacked sufficient effectiveness and it was feared that the government would not spend adequate funds to develop new countermeasures. The "War on Terror" has given rise to a new industry that is more than willing to develop countermeasures without any government funding. [17] See, for example, the discussion of "Project Bioshield" which is contained in "Criminal Justice in the 21st Century: Overcriminalization of American Life", September 2003, p. 18. [18] The GAO report also recommended an "aggressive" public education effort to "explain that nanotechnology is not as dangerous as widely thought." The report suggested that public education was warranted because "many Americans don't see the benefits of nanotechnology and are worried about its potential negative consequences." [19] GAO's "Report to the Chairman, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives, `Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Diverse Applications and Future Prospects'," (September, 2007). [20] The GAO report also identified "cultural and bureaucratic factors" as factors that "limit" the effectiveness of "government-sponsored R&D programs," especially given the fact that these programs are "run by civil servants who often see themselves as being responsible for all technological progress regardless of any potential impact on other areas." The GAO report also noted the fact that government R&D personnel are sometimes "more focused on the technical merit and feasibility of the technology" and that they can be "resistant to research that is more applied in nature." The report then concluded that the bureaucratic barriers to effective "safety" research are a significant barrier to implementation of the research into the program that supports research in the field of biosecurity. [21] According to a January 8, 2007, New York Times article, nanotech manufacturers are planning to market, in the next year or two, a "whole new range of materials [that will] replace plastic." The article further reports that "much of the industry hype now centers on 'functional nanomaterials,' as opposed to the nanoparticles most of us are used to thinking about. Functional materials mean nanoscale building blocks that can actually perform their functions in ways we see in nature." [22] The article states: Some new discoveries point the way to a future with plastics that are stronger than steel and stronger than many metals; ones that repel bugs and even self-repair; and ones that are less dangerous to eat and to drink, and which clean up hazardous wastes, among many other applications. In the coming decades, new materials will probably be able to do in the body what they do in the lab: detect diseases; deliver drugs; find tumors or other health problems before a patient even knows about them. Drew J. Eckhardt, "Nanotechnology: The Next Great Thing," Wired Magazine, December 2004. [23] Ibid. [24] Ibid. [25] Ibid. [26] The GAO report also identified a number of specific barriers which are also identified in the "Fear of the Unknown" report, namely a lack of effective coordination and collaboration; insufficient funding and insufficient priority for research; a lack of coordination between government agencies; regulatory barriers that hinder the application of research results; and lack of transparency in biosecurity programs. The GAO report concludes that "most of the actions recommended" by GAO would have to be implemented "by Executive Branch agencies without Congressional involvement." While some of these recommendations were enacted in the fall of 2007, it would appear that further action will be needed if a successful biosecurity program is to be developed