she had heard noises and felt a vibration in the wall. [¶] She got up, and she saw defendant in the room and she called out to him, and then she screamed. He ran out of the apartment. And I think that's when the police arrived. [¶] When the police arrived, she led them up the stairs to [defendant] in the garage, who was in the process of dressing." The prosecutor argued defendant had not suffered any legal prejudice, stating, "[T]here was no evidence that [his] defense was harmed. [Defendant] was found not guilty of all charges. He is not incarcerated on these allegations." Defendant asked the court to keep his "current bond in place" so he could return home to his two children and their mother. He said, "I should not be going through this, I can't sleep at night," and that "my daughter is scared because she has no idea what happened that night." The trial court denied defendant's request for a preliminary injunction: "[I]t is my understanding that the defendant has made a similar request in this case. . . . I have reviewed the materials provided by [defendant] . . . . It does not, in any way, change my analysis." The court ordered, "[T]he bond is going to be continued at this time." 11  II. DISCUSSION In November 2012, in the case that gave rise to the prosecution of the November 2012 charges, defendant was charged in a 12-count criminal complaint with seven sex crimes against his stepdaughter A. (Case No. 12WF1820). In January 2013, defendant was acquitted of those charges following a jury trial. Defendant argues that the acquittal establishes he did not commit a felony against A, so the trial court erred by denying his request for a preliminary injunction. A. Standard of Review The law pertaining to whether a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction is well established. " 'Preliminary injunctions are "interlocutory pretrial judicial proceedings" [citation] . . . . "The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction does not involve a determination of the ultimate rights in controversy. It merely determines that the court, balancing the respective equities of the parties, concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising rights claimed by him." ' [Citations.] Because of the summary nature of preliminary injunctions, an appellate court's review of such an order is governed by the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard." (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1095-1096.) "Discretion is abused whenever, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered." (Nance v. NLRB (9th Cir. 1985) 705 F.2d 705, 707.) 12  The standard of review for an order denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis is also well established. The application for an order of habeas corpus can only be based on error of law apparent on the record. (See People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1095; People v. Adams (2014) 60 Cal.4th 541, 546, fn. 2.) Appellate courts give great deference to trial courts in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to grant or deny a motion for a preliminary injunction. However, when the facts relied on by the trial court are in dispute, it is the appellate court's role to conduct an independent review of the factual and legal issues raised. (Gelco Corp. v. Constr. Laborer's Vacation Trust (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1410, 1421.) B. Analysis The trial court granted a preliminary injunction based on its findings that defendant's ex-wife's testimony established (1) she was a victim of defendant, (2) she did not intend to repeat her testimony against defendant at trial, and (3) defendant had not been shown to have any significant adverse interests in this action. The court found that defendant had not shown any legally cognizable prejudice resulting from the prosecution of the case against him for November 2012 charges. On appeal, defendant contends his acquittal on charges relating to sexual abuse against his stepdaughter bars the People from proceeding with prosecution for the same alleged offenses against defendant's biological daughter in this action. As defendant did not address these contentions at the trial court level, he cannot raise them for the first time on appeal. 13  A motion for a preliminary injunction is the remedy to prevent the irreparable harm that could result from any interim deprivation of an important right, including the right to be free from the actual or threatened violation of law. (Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686, 713; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) "The party seeking the injunction has the burden of producing evidence sufficient to make a prima facie showing he or she will be successful on the merits. (Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., supra, at p. 713.) The injunction is properly denied if the evidence produced by the party seeking the injunction does not show such a likelihood. (Ibid.) "A successful section 1983 action must establish that the defendant has violated the plaintiff's federal constitutional or statutory rights. However, section 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging final judgments of criminal convictions. Rather, a section 1983 claim for unlawful conviction, imprisonment, or detention must be filed in the original court of conviction. [Citations.] 'The proper forum for such a collateral attack is provided by 28 U.S.C. section 2254, which requires a petitioner to exhaust state remedies and permits federal courts to interfere with pending state court proceedings only in limited circumstances.' [Citation.] Because section 1983 is not a vehicle for challenging the validity of a conviction, 'the claim presented by [petitioner] is properly characterized as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' [Citation.] "We conclude that the order denying plaintiff's petition is void because the relief granted was not one the court could grant under its equitable powers. First, the court's order is void to the extent it purported to grant or enforce the preliminary injunction because an injunction to prevent trial is a prerogative of the appellate courts. (See 14 People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1095 [noting that preliminary injunctions are, in general, an extraordinary remedy and a prerogative of the appellate courts].) Second, the order is void to the extent it purported to grant a new trial based on the admission of illegally seized evidence. (Cf. Brown v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 741, 750 [recognizing a trial court's inherent power to order a new trial when an error has been committed which, in the court's opinion, prevented a fair trial].) Finally, the order is void to the extent it purports to grant relief by vacating the judgment, as it does not appear the court had jurisdiction to grant the judgment vacated. (See In re Ramirez (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 390, 400 ["Because a trial court lacks inherent jurisdiction to vacate a void judgment, a void judgment may be attacked at any time, directly or collaterally."].) If relief is granted on appeal, it must be ordered by a reviewing court, not the trial court. Thus, [this court] concludes that the order is void." (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1097.) Here, defendant did not show that the prosecution of his "current" case—the November 2012 charges—would constitute a legal injury to him and did not show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on that issue. Defendant therefore was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. 15  DISPOSITION The order denying defendant's petition for a writ of coram nobis or habeas corpus is affirmed. BENKE, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: McDONALD, J. O'ROURKE, J. 16