DOT Prison Currency Transfers" and "Lobbyist Pay to Leaders." On February 22, 2001, the United States Department of Defense requested that the United States Department of Justice investigate whether Mr. Blasini violated Executive Order 12939, Executive Order No. 13050, and Financial Audit Guidelines. 8 On March 27, 2001, the United States Department of Justice, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.35(a)(2), certified the investigation to the United States Attorney for the District of Kansas, who subsequently referred it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). See 28 C.F.R. § 0.35(a)(2)(2002). On July 13, 2001, the United States Department of Justice concluded its investigation by filing a summary of findings and presenting it to the United States Department of Defense. The summary concluded that Mr. Blasini had violated Department of Defense policy and regulations, but recommended that no civil or criminal proceedings be brought against him. See Appendix at 11. 9 The United States Department of Justice terminated its investigation of Mr. Blasini on October 1, 2001. 10 Mr. Blasini died on December 31, 2001. He left behind a widow and three children. 11 Ms. McGuire's claims against Mr. Blasini have not yet been adjudicated. II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 The United States may be substituted as a party in a case to which the Government is a party to the action solely because of its interest in the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (West 2000). In general, a party suing the Government is entitled to representation by the United States Attorney. 13 The United States Attorney, however, "shall supervise all litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party or has a direct and substantial interest, and shall conduct the same with the ordinary skill of attorneys." 28 U.S.C. § 518(a). Upon the death of a party to an action, the United States may, upon written request of an interested person and certification of death and a desire to substitute the United States as defendant, become a party to the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a). 14 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1), when a party dies, the "action does not abate," and "[t]he court may order substitution of the proper parties." The question here is who is the proper party: Ms. McGuire, the personal representative of Mr. Blasini's estate, or Ms. Blasini, his widow. 15 It is settled law in this Circuit that a personal representative has no right to recover damages for a wrongful death. See O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 842, 846 (2d Cir.1984) (citing Tew v. Sun Oil Co., Inc., 551 F.2d 361, 366 (10th Cir.1977)). It is also settled law that a wrongful death claim brought under the Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA"), 46 U.S.C. app. § 761, survives the death of the decedent and is an asset of his estate.2 See In re Allstate Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 496, 497 (9th Cir.1993). 16 Here, Mr. Blasini's personal representative argues that it, and not Ms. Blasini, is the proper party because all claims against him vested in the widow upon his death. Ms. Blasini argues that under Kansas law, wrongful death claims survive only if the spouse can show that she and her husband had an agreement to institute the lawsuit before the death. 17 In the context of federal law, the district court of Kansas has held that federal law preempts the application of state law when determining who is a proper party in a wrongful death case. A court sitting in admiralty applies substantive federal law. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447, 114 S.Ct. 981, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994). Federal maritime law is governed by DOHSA, 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq., which provides that "[w]hen . . . the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued." 18 There is nothing in DOHSA itself that addresses how to determine who is the proper plaintiff in a wrongful death action. DOHSA provides for suits in federal court, but not the parties that can be sued. We are therefore left to turn to other laws for guidance. 19 There are two different, yet overlapping, sources of authority for determining the proper party plaintiff. First, DOHSA contains no limitations on the parties who may bring wrongful death actions. DOHSA provides the federal rule of decision in admiralty cases, as it does not "specifically provide[] for the survival of [the] particular actions." The HAMILTON, 15 F.2d at 605. Therefore, no party to a DOHSA suit can bring claims that it would not be able to bring were DOHSA not involved. Second, federal common law, in particular the Jones Act and DOHSA, see Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 319, 80 S.Ct. 341, 4 L.Ed.2d 305 (1960) (concluding that the Jones Act incorporates DOHSA into federal law), provides the rule of decision for DOHSA claims. However, the statutes alone do not provide the answer as to who is a proper party plaintiff in a wrongful death action brought pursuant to DOHSA. 20 As the common law courts have done in the past, we turn to the Jones Act to determine the proper party plaintiff in this case. DOHSA provides an "exclusive" remedy for wrongful death in certain maritime cases. 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. Therefore, in cases falling within DOHSA, the Jones Act supplies the rule of decision. This rule of decision incorporates common law principles of survival of actions in the context of maritime causes of action. 21 The Supreme Court has held that the Jones Act "incorporated the usual rules of the maritime law as they existed at the time of its passage." The HAMILTON, 15 F.2d at 606 (citing The Rolph, 299 F. 368, 373 (3d Cir.1924)); see also Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 7-8, 66 S.Ct. 869, 90 L.Ed. 1045 (1946). Before passage of the Jones Act, the Supreme Court determined the proper party plaintiff in a case arising out of a maritime accident on the high seas. In The HAMILTON, a suit by the personal representative of the decedent for damages for the death of a longshoreman, the Court held that "[w]here a longshoreman is injured through the negligence of those engaged upon the ship in its maintenance and operation, or through the unseaworthiness of its appliances, the right to recover damages depends wholly upon the [Jones] Act." The HAMILTON, 15 F.2d at 605. 22 However, the Court in The HAMILTON noted that this rule was "dictum," and that it was unclear whether the Jones Act included a survival rule. The Court cited no authority and offered no rationale for its holding. The The HAMILTON court did not address any of the theories put forth by the parties or the dissent in the case to explain the rationale for a survival rule. See id. at 608-09.3 23 A court may look to common law sources to determine the proper party plaintiff in a wrongful death action. See DOHSA; 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. For instance, the Second Circuit in O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 842, 845-46 (2d Cir.1984) found that the Jones Act permitted a widow to bring a wrongful death action for the death of her husband, who was a longshoreman covered under the Jones Act. A similar case is Kuntz v. Windjammer "Barefoot" Cruises, Ltd., 573 F.Supp. 1277, 1280-81 (W.D.Pa.1983).4 24 Here, even if we assume that the Jones Act includes a survival rule, we must look to the law of admiralty to determine whether the rule survives a longshoreman's death. This rule was explained in Schiller v. Mit-Clip Co., 180 F.2d 654 (2d Cir.1950). In Schiller, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the personal