Prenuptial Escape Clauses, 72 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 1293, 1304 (2003) (citation omitted). However, it is important to note that the majority rule is that prenuptial agreements are valid, enforceable and not against public policy. Id. at 1295. The New Jersey Supreme Court has declined to consider prenuptial agreements in the context of a divorce action. Cohen v. Cohen, 124 N.J.Super. 588, 308 A.2d 87, 89 (Ch.Div.1973) (finding that only a suit for an accounting may be brought after a divorce). The Court of Chancery has declined to hear pre-divorce disputes that may require the parties to reveal the terms of their prenuptial agreement. Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1, 5 (1983). The only time New Jersey courts have considered a prenuptial agreement was in a divorce case that involved an appeal from an interlocutory judgment. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a; D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 100 N.J.Super. 200, 241 A.2d 849, 851 (Ch.Div.1968). The Court found that the prenuptial agreement was valid because it had been entered into voluntarily and with independent counsel. Id. at 852. The Court opined that parties should be able to decide what agreements they make with respect to their property in the same way that they decide what arrangements they wish to make for their children. Id. The Court's opinion indicated that the prenuptial agreement would be binding, even if the parties could not later rescind or modify the prenuptial agreement in their divorce action. Id. at 853. In this case, the prenuptial agreement has not been challenged. The parties are both in agreement that the agreement was entered into freely, voluntarily, and with independent counsel and that they both understand the terms of the agreement. The Prenuptial Agreement in this case is not a model of clear drafting, but it is no different than agreements entered into by married couples. The prenuptial agreement *1239 provides that the parties "represent and warrant that they have entered into this Agreement voluntarily, that they fully understand its meaning, and that they understand and accept the consequences of this Agreement." Because the prenuptial agreement is valid, the case is remanded to the trial court so that the prenuptial agreement can be effectuated and to resolve any issues regarding the transfer of property made in the prenuptial agreement, as per its terms. The prenuptial agreement contains no terms that would preclude either party from receiving an award of support or spousal support. However, as indicated in the prenuptial agreement, no support or spousal support will be awarded to either party. D. Finally, the wife asserts that the trial judge did not give adequate consideration to the prenuptial agreement in his award of spousal support to the wife. A court may modify an award of spousal support upon a showing of changed circumstances. Schisler v. Schisler, 136 N.J.Super. 105, 111, 344 A.2d 563 (App.Div. 1975). The standard for modification of alimony is much less stringent than that for modification of support or custody. See Long v. West, 294 N.J.Super. 276, 683 A.2d 272, 275 (Ch.Div. 1996) (holding that the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the changes in circumstances). The wife is correct in her assertion that the standard for determining whether a support obligation should be modified is whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146, 416 A.2d 45 (1980). In determining that the wife's childcare expenses were non-marital obligations of the husband, the trial judge noted that the language of the prenuptial agreement stated that there would be no need for child support. In his statement of reasons, the trial judge stated that it was his understanding that both parties were "aware of their obligations" to support their respective children. While that finding was based on the prenuptial agreement, it was also based on the fact that the wife had been awarded sole custody of the children and the husband had been ordered to pay child support. Given that order, which continued after the parties' divorce, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the wife was entitled to a support award. We have considered the arguments and find they do not have sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, the judgment of the Chancery Division is affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the Chancery Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. NOTES [1] During the divorce trial, the parties stipulated that the husband was current on his alimony and child support obligations. [2] The prenuptial agreement provides: The Husband and the Wife hereby agree that neither shall in any way demand or claim that the other provide any type of alimony, support, maintenance, or contribution to either spouse or to the couple's children from a previous marriage, now or hereafter, for any reason, except for the following situations: * * * * If the wife survives the husband, and there is a period during which the husband has no earning capacity or support or maintenance and support obligation pursuant to a court order, then the wife shall be entitled to support for a period of four (4) years from the date of the husband's death, by reason of the husband's prior support and maintenance obligations.