Another argument against these transfers comes from the fact that some of the men on board were killed in action on the _Emden_ and would not have been given special privileges as prisoners. It should be remembered, however, that they would all have been brought back to Australia to join the others on the strength of having been taken from the _Emden_. The German Navy was not as well organised as it should have been and, by way of a last desperate measure, the men on board were given extra comforts as a gesture to their families, and the _Emden_ was loaded with such luxuries as sardines and biscuits. This would have taken much time to do, and time was of the essence. In this they would have been assisted by a British newspaper article dated 9 August, just four days before the battle started. It said that German sailors were very interested in what occurred to enemy warships taken by the enemy. They wondered 'if they have been destroyed by explosion? If so, what weapons were used? The answer must come within two days'. No reference was made to the fact that there were no survivors from the _Emden_ , and although the _Emden_ was clearly referred to, they seemed to know about the _Karlsruhe_ and the _Dresden_. As the battle approached, there was a feeling that there must be survivors on board, and the Australians who would fight at Anzac were told that 'there was a rumor that survivors from the _Emden_ were captured'. The Australian newspaper, the _Bathurst Times_ , thought that the men on board should have been armed with rifles and, as they were not, it must have been the reason that they could not use any more artillery. As no reports of survivors came in, it could have been a matter of surprise that they appeared to be armed only with small-calibre rifles. The last part of this theory is probably justified by the fact that a large quantity of ammunition had been on board when the _Emden_ sank. If there were any survivors, they would have been in possession of this, and they would have been a major obstacle to the attacking force, since they could have used it against the men on the submarines. There were still survivors from the attack on the Australian hospital ship _Tweed_ , and no doubt these also played an important part in the defence of the _Emden_. Even with the survivors on board, it must have been difficult to manoeuvre the submarines against any possible interference from the shore. At least two officers and fifteen men managed to man the _Emden_ , so it must have been a tough proposition for her. It may be concluded that if there were any survivors they would have been armed with pistols and rifles, and would be used as scouts. It seems quite possible that they could have used their rifles to good effect against the submarines. From all these considerations it is quite possible that the submarines did not, in fact, damage the _Emden_ but would have simply been unable to fire a salvo in return. It would be an error to assume that no ammunition had been fired, as the captain of the _Emden_ did show the most courageous leadership. As he had only himself and the officers to organise a defence, he may have feared that the submarine might damage him while he was working on the guns. Some of the men on board were able to make up their minds before they were rescued. One, a cook, jumped into the water wearing full diving equipment, while another used a bag filled with biscuits and water to help him to swim in. A young German, about 19 years of age, was standing on the foredeck when the submarine attacked the _Emden_. This man wore a life-jacket and had his life-saving equipment and a pair of shoes, so it may be assumed that he had been told that the submarines were approaching. It could not be said that he had been trained for any emergency, such as an underwater raid. He may have suffered an attack of terror and had not been able to act in time, while the others in the submarine who were in a position to do something had taken his place on the bridge. On the subject of the possibility of escape, Captain von Müller, the only surviving officer, told an Australian who spoke German that when the submarine closed in, 'He (von Müller) said he gave orders to shoot any one who would jump overboard'. The man he was referring to was a quartermaster who, although still lying down in the chart room, jumped into the water, leaving his cap, and all his loose gear on the chart table. As the submersibles approached, the captain appeared on the bridge with two of his officers. He ordered his men to open the boats. The first boat was launched from the bridge, and a second followed soon after. As this boat was about to be lowered, the men had no time to get out of the way. One man, a carpenter, was cut in two by the propellers of the submersible as it drove over the boat, and his remains were picked up later in one of the boats. They decided to risk staying on board to try to help the wounded, but they found that there were none. From the bridge the submarine passed along the _Emden_ 's port side, where the funnel stands, making a dive. It was at this point that it is believed that the officer in charge dropped his pistol in his haste to get away. The submarine left at 2.20 a.m. There had been an interval of four hours between the first and second attacks. It must have been assumed that all had perished, but in fact a very large proportion survived, the _Emden_ being one of the very few ships sunk in this war in which there were survivors. The last officer left on the bridge, Second Lieutenant von Brüning, did not try to get away. He stayed on the bridge until the submersible came so near that the crew could recognise him, and a bullet passed through his cap. He was not badly wounded and had not been wounded before the submarine attacked. The captain was wounded on the bridge, as were many of the other officers, and the first lieutenant was wounded on the orlop deck. The officer who dropped his pistol while the submarine was passing along the side of the _Emden_ and went back on to the bridge may have been Lieutenant von Oppeln, the engineer officer. This officer went with Captain Müller, when the latter came out of his cabin to make his inspection of the gun positions. The captain met an Australian correspondent on his way, and said to him: 'The submarine is still coming. In three minutes it will be here'. The torpedo attack which was used so effectively by the _U35_ against the _Emden_ would appear to have been a surprise to her captain, Captain Pünter, because the _U35_ was not observed while it was being manoeuvred around the _Emden_. It was not until the torpedoes had been fired that Captain Pünter discovered the presence of the submarine. The reason for the absence of the escort vessel which was ordered by Müller to keep off was that this ship had a boiler-man ashore, who was being sent ashore for a rest. The escort had gone to rescue an officer who had been wounded, and the ship's doctor was at home on leave. It appears that this was one of the unfortunate episodes of having such a mixed group of men in the ship. The _U35_ , commanded by Lieutenant Schepke, sank the _Karlsruhe_ off Papeete in French Polynesia on 21 August 1917. ( _Naval Review_ , 1936). The _Emden_ was badly holed and it was clear that she could not fight any more. According to her captain, Captain Pünter, he had not had any previous dealings with the _U35_. As soon as the submarine manoeuvred so that it was possible for her to make an attack, he rang the main steam whistle to warn the crew, and at the same time, since it is not possible to make a submerged torpedo attack, he called out 'Get ready, rifles, pistols'. He did not consider that he had much time, and this was why he ordered his men to arm themselves before the second submarine arrived. A similar case occurred on the _Karlsruhe_. As the submarine was approaching to make a dive attack, her captain ordered his men to arm themselves before she dived. His men did not arm themselves, and were unaware that the submarine was not approaching the _Karlsruhe_ for the purpose of destroying her. When he saw her coming nearer, he tried to dive, but it was too late. If they had had the guns on board, they might have defeated her. It is not suggested that the other submarines could have done anything to alter the course of the _Emden_ , but in any case they would not have been able to hit her with a torpedo, as the commander of the _U35_ had stated that he had the exact position of the _Emden_ at this time. They would have had to surface to get their chance of a broadside on, and this would have been a waste of ammunition. It is of interest that the _U35_ was able to sail out of the harbour, in spite of being on an even keel. But this does not rule out the fact that