Lewd conduct includes conduct that "tends to corrupt morals, to outrage the sense of public decency, to shock the public conscience, or otherwise outrage the sense of public propriety." The State's own expert, Dr. William Burt, testified that sexual deviancy is a mental disorder in the sense that it is a chronic, harmful disease of the mind; that it is essentially a sexual disorder in that a person's sexual behavior is dysfunctional; and that it is not a morally objectionable way of life. Dr. Burt also explained that sexual deviancy is an illness characterized by sexually inappropriate behavior. Dr. Richard C. Gartner, another defense expert, offered similar opinions concerning the characterization of sexual deviancy as a mental illness. In light of the foregoing evidence, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing evidence that the appellant committed and attempted to commit indecent exposure. We overrule the appellant's first ground for review. In his second ground for review, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to present testimony that he and his first wife had sexual relations on the night he committed the offenses at issue. At a pretrial hearing, defense counsel made an offer of proof in which she stated that the appellant's first wife would testify that after she returned home that night, the appellant came to her house and said "he had a problem at the store that night and he needed [the appellant's] help to pick up [his] kids from the store" because "his wife" was having a "problem." The appellant argues that he was attempting to present evidence that the reason he went to the convenience store where he was later arrested is because he was picking up his children from the store on behalf of his first wife. He argues that this evidence is probative to explain why he committed an indecent exposure offense. The record reflects that the trial court did not allow the proffered evidence because it was hearsay. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the evidence. Generally, hearsay evidence is admissible only if it falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d at 140; Zuliani v. State, 52 S.W.3d 825, 834 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). Whether hearsay evidence is admissible depends on the purpose for which it is offered. The appellant argues that this evidence is relevant to prove his state of mind at the time of the offense. He also argues that it is relevant to rebut the State's theory of flight. We find that neither ground would provide a basis for the admission of this evidence. First, we find that this evidence does not fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. See TEX.R. EVID. 803(24). Second, we find that this evidence does not directly rebut the State's theory of flight. The proffered evidence was not evidence of the appellant's flight, but evidence of an alternative motive for his conduct. We find that this evidence is irrelevant to the appellant's state of mind and its probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See TEX.R. EVID. 401, 403. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence. We overrule the appellant's second ground for review. In his third ground for review, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on a defense of voluntary intoxication. The trial court denied the appellant's request to charge the jury on this defense, and instructed the jury on the defense of insanity. In reviewing a charge for error, we must first determine whether error actually exists in the charge. See Sakil v. State, 287 S.W.3d 23, 25 (Tex. Crim.App.2009). In Sakil, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained that Article 36.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires that "[a] charge shall not contain any" instruction or definitions "not *836 necessary to enable the jury to render a verdict." See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (Vernon Supp. 2009); Sakil, 287 S.W.3d at 25; accord Gray v. State, 152 S.W.3d 125, 127 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (requiring "some harm" for reversal of improper instruction on lesser-included offense). To determine whether a definition or instruction was necessary, we review the entire charge in the context of the case and its circumstances. Sakil, 287 S.W.3d at 25. In a criminal prosecution for a general intent crime, voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge requiring proof of intentional or knowing conduct. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 2003) (intentional or knowing conduct requires knowledge of the result of the conduct, but not the conduct itself); Gray, 152 S.W.3d at 127-28. The appellant argues that there is a dispute in this case regarding the issue of whether he committed a general intent offense. He contends that if he committed a voluntary intoxication offense, then he did not have the requisite intent to commit that offense because he was incapable of forming the intent required by the law. He therefore argues that he was entitled to a jury instruction on this defense, and that he was harmed by the trial court's refusal to submit a voluntary intoxication instruction to the jury. We find no error in the trial court's refusal to submit an instruction on voluntary intoxication. The appellant's contention about the existence of a factual dispute regarding the nature of his conduct is based on a misstatement of the law. Under the law of parties, the appellant was guilty of the offense of indecency with a child if he (1) acted with intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire, or (2) intended to promote or assist the commission of the offense by another person who was actually present and participated in the act. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). The record reflects that the appellant told the jury in his confession that he fondled the complainant while he was with both men in the back seat. His confession was admitted into evidence, and it did not contain any mention of voluntary intoxication. The State did not present evidence at trial that the appellant acted alone. The appellant points us to no evidence admitted at trial that would have allowed the jury to conclude that the appellant committed an act of only simple negligence or recklessness and not intended harm. See Warr v. State, 418 S.W.2d 685, 689-90 (Tex.Crim.App.1967) (rejecting involuntary intoxication defense where there was no evidence that defendant was insane due to involuntary intoxication). There was no evidence from which the jury could have determined that the appellant, at the time of the alleged offense, was so intoxicated that he was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (providing that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to an offense requiring proof of intentional or knowing conduct). Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication. We overrule the appellant's third ground for review. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Justice JENNINGS, concurring. VANCE, J., concurs without opinion. NOTES [1] The State waived Count 3 of the indictment, which alleged the offense of indecency with a child by contact, as the acts alleged in the count were the same as the acts alleged in the count alleging indecency with a child by exposure. [2] The two experts agreed that there was some risk of recidivism associated with pedophilia.