Lewd conduct includes but is not limited to indecent assault, sodomy, criminal sexual contact, aggravated indecent assault, or sexual abuse.” In addition, the regulations provide: “The conduct does not include commission of a non-criminal infraction or traffic citation that does not involve alcohol, drugs, or tobacco.” (Emphasis added.) The phrase “criminal . . . infraction” can reasonably be interpreted to exclude traffic citations not involving alcohol. 18  No. 2017AP1269.akz and inadmissibility "from those of like grade and rank, subject . . . to such exceptions as the President of the United States may authorize in regulations to be made." The Board was unambiguously granted the authority to make exceptions and "such exceptions as the President may authorize in regulations to be made" to "[t]he general rule." The President delegated his power to establish rules concerning inadmissibility to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of State. See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5), 6 U.S.C. § 202(3). ¶70 The President authorized the Secretary of State "to make rules to provide for the prompt exclusion and expulsion of aliens . . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1221(a). "The power to delegate . . . is implied in the grant of authority to the President." United States v. Guess, 543 F.2d 698, 703 (5th Cir. 1976). The Board has authority to make exceptions from a rule that establishes inadmissibility "such exceptions as the President may authorize in regulations to be made," which is to say, the Board may interpret the regulation, including by adding to the regulations. ¶71 Although the "general rule" generally requires the denial of visas, the President has expressly permitted the Board to deviate from this general rule by permitting a noncitizen to obtain a visa if that noncitizen has no history of past conduct that would be disqualifying under this rule, among other conditions for issuance of a visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(B). This visa exemption, however, "shall not be regarded as providing immunity from the application of the [provision in the United 19  No. 2017AP1269.akz States Code] that bars admission of . . . aliens who advocate or assist terrorist activity." Id. ¶72 In other words, the visa exemption is a special visa application which should not be confused with general admission of noncitizens for permanent resident visas. As a result, any noncitizen who applies for this visa exemption cannot be said to apply for admission into the United States but instead is seeking a visa application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). ¶73 There are three ways a noncitizen may apply for a visa, at the time of application, based on admissibility requirements: (1) he can be present in the United States and seeking admission, 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(4); (2) he can be seeking admission but be "inspected and admitted" as a temporary nonimmigrant or "parole" nonimmigrant, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1), (2), 1251(a)(2), 1252(a)(1), 1255(a); and (3) he can be seeking admission as an immigrant, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). The visa exemptions, however, are for noncitizens who seek to immigrate. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (stating that a "visa" is "an alien's document authorizing entry into the United States"); see also, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1203(d)(3) (referring to a "nonimmigrant visa"); 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (referring to a "visa "); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(d) (referring to a "visa" or "application for admission"). ¶74 Noncitizens must apply for a visa before the Department of State may issue visas to them. This requirement, however, does not preclude the noncitizen's attempting to obtain the consular non-immmigration visa exemption from the Secretary of State because "the executive branch of government . . . lacks 20  No. 2017AP1269.akz direct authority to enforce immigration law" and therefore must "rely on private parties to carry out its mission." Dickson v. Sec'y of Def., 68 F.3d 1396, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted). ¶75 We conclude that the law governing the noncitizen status of Petitioners under the INA is clear and unequivocal. 3. The Board's decision is consistent with case law and statutory provisions. ¶76 Respondents argue that the Board's denial of the noncitizens' claims under the INA violated their constitutional rights, and we must therefore "exercise great caution in making such a policy judgment." Nelson v. Williams, 624 F.3d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, there is no reason to suspect that the Board's interpretation and application of the INA would deny due process, either substantive or procedural due process. Accordingly, we examine the Board's decision under the constitutional standards described above. The constitutional issues must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. ¶77 For example, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), the United States Supreme Court struck down a law that excluded citizens of Africa from participating in the Missouri Territorial Legislature. The law effectively denied Africans citizenship in the United States, even though citizens were not excluded from entry into the United States. 60 U.S. at 413. The Supreme Court held that the denial of citizenship was not constitutionally valid because "the right of citizenship was reserved to the white race alone, and any one abridging the 21  No. 2017AP1269.akz privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States is thereby declared guilty of a crime." Id. at 413-14. ¶78 The Board's decision to exclude noncitizens who have engaged in criminal activity is analogous to the denial of a citizen's claim to due process under the Dred Scott decision. A noncitizen's attempt to obtain a waiver of inadmissibility has been viewed "not as the award of a privilege or an immunity but as a privilege of entry into this country, not one of citizenship, and a waiver thereof would be a waiver of nothing more than a privilege, a form of partial disentitlement, which if granted would allow a nonimmigrant alien to live permanently in this country." Matter of Correa, 19 I. & N. Dec. 130, 134 (BIA 1985) (explaining inadmissibility based on criminal conduct by a visitor). The Board's interpretation of the INA in similar situations is not unconstitutional. The Board has the power to determine admissibility and ineligibility to receive an immigration benefit, and its application of the law in this case was reasonable. ¶79 An analysis of the United States Supreme Court's cases has suggested that the Board's decisions are rational in "ac