More Than Meats the Eye: The Problem of Animal Representation in Nature Photography_ (New York: Springer, 2010). 19. For a discussion of the significance of the act of seeing in animal conservation and the animal visual arts, see John M. MacKenzie, _Animals, Politics and Morality_ (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 65. 20. Ibid., 70. 21. Ibid., 70. 22. Ibid., 83. 23. I discuss this particular exhibition further in Chapter 3 below. The first in what proved a long series of exhibitions of images of African fauna is John Drury's _Vanishing Animals_ , which was exhibited at the National Museum in Copenhagen in 1937. The next is Alfred Gell's _Art and Agency_ , which takes the shape of an exhibition catalogue, and that was first published in 1979 and then exhibited internationally in London, Melbourne, Washington, New York, Washington, D.C., and Copenhagen, amongst other cities. The later exhibitions and books by Steven H. Resnik ( _Thinking Animals: Toward a Jurisprudence of Animal Rights_ , 2nd edn [New York: New York University Press, 2002], _Refiguring the Spirit: Toward a New Science of Religion_ [New York: SUNY Press, 1995] and _Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction_ [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002]) and Mark B. Adams and Anna Maranta (eds) _Carnism_ (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), and in 2016 I will be lecturing at Oxford University's _Animal Sentience Conference_. A significant feature of these texts is that they make a distinction between 'sentience' and 'animal subjectivity'. The first term is used by cognitive scientists and neuroscientists and refers to an organism's ability to perceive its environment and to 'feel' the world, making it 'aware' of what is around it. 'Animal subjectivity', in contrast, suggests a way of knowing and experiencing the world from the animal's own 'point of view'. The argument is that sentience is related to consciousness, and hence to a 'subject', while animal subjectivity suggests the world as the animal's 'environment'. See Susan J. Armstrong, _The Animal Side: Personal Ethics and the Treatment of Animals_ (London: Routledge, 2001). 24. For a discussion of the human/animal distinction in various discourses that are central to the politics of species and the arts, see Jodi O'Brien, _Biopolitics_ (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 3–4. 25. See Donna Haraway, _When Species Meet_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 8–10. Haraway's work explores questions of how the animal human is constructed in the context of nature studies in North America and how the cultural construction of species as different human-like kinds has resulted in the 'domestication' of animals. For a discussion of the human/animal distinction and subjectivity in the work of Donna Haraway, see Jodi O'Brien, 'Human/Animal Discontinuity: Donna Haraway's Companion Species Politics', _Canadian Journal of Education_ , 29/2 (2008): 161–74. 26. See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre's _Whose Justice? Which Rationality?_ (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Hans-Georg Gadamer's _Truth and Method_ (London: Continuum, 1989); and Richard Rorty's _Objectivity, Relativism and Truth_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 27. Stephen J. Gould, _The Structure of Evolutionary Theory_ (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002), 15–16. 28. Ibid., 16. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. David Rothenberg, _Other Selves: An Inquiry into Nonhuman and Transhuman Persons_ (London: Macmillan, 2001), 1. 32. Ibid., 11. 33. Ibid., 16. 34. The philosopher Martin Heidegger developed his work in an anti-scientific era and did not consider the idea of evolutionary theory when he discussed the being of man and his relation to the being of the animal. On the other hand, Darwin's insights also prompted the philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1906–1995) to examine the implications of Darwinian science for philosophical questions concerning the human-animal divide, leading him to conclude that Darwin and Heidegger shared an understanding that humans were always-already 'engaged' in relation to animals. He argued that 'both of them shared a common concept of man, as a being standing in a unique relation to animals. They thus shared an orientation to man and his essence, and thereby an orientation to the animal. This "orientation" is the foundation of humanism.' See Cassirer, _The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau_ (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 34. 35. The anthropologist Marcel Mauss wrote about the significance of the distinction between the human and animal as the way humans express and order their social relations and their modes of living in the natural world. See his 'Essai sur le don', in _Sociologie et anthropologie_ (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000), 25–47. 36. Martin Heidegger, _Being and Time_ (1927), trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 7. In his introduction to the work of Heidegger, Richard Foltz notes the importance of evolutionary theory to Heidegger's work and especially how he argued that 'animals are no less significant than humans'. Heidegger, _Existentialism, Old and New_ (1949; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2003), vii. See Richard Foltz, 'Heidegger, Human and Nonhuman Persons', _Continental Philosophy Review_ , 47 (2014): 131–44. 37. Martin Heidegger, _The Question Concerning Technology_ (1954), trans. William Lovitt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 4. 38. Ibid., 4–5. 39. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, _A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). This book is also one of the sources of inspiration for Donna Haraway's work and especially for her book _The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness_ (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003). On the influence of Deleuze and Guattari on Haraway, see Jodi O'Brien, 'Wild Ethics: An Animal Ethics for our non-human Selves', in _The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness_ , ed. Donna Haraway (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003), 41–57. For a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's work and the idea of the non-human as a companion, see Catherine Keller, 'Non-Human Compatriots', _Cultural Anthropology_ , 23/3 (2008): 418–49. 40. Catherine Keller, 'Human-Animal Companionship', _Anthropological Theory_ , 9 (2010): 225–49. 41. David Rothenberg, ' _Sterk en slikke menneske_ : Heidegger and the Animal', _Continental Philosophy Review_ , 47 (2014): 125–35. 42. Paul Cohn, _An Anthropologist Among the Philosophers: Essays on History, Culture, and Morality_ (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 5. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid., 6. 45. The distinction I am making here between 'human/non-human' and 'human/animal' difference is of course indebted to the work of Donna Haraway and her claim that we have to learn to think through the question of 'significant otherness' that marks our 'non-human companions'. I am indebted to the work of Donna Haraway for encouraging me to develop a more nuanced understanding of the different kinds of differentness involved in the animal subject. The difference between humans and animals that Haraway acknowledges is evident in her earlier argument that animal kinship is 'kinning' rather than 'kunning'. Haraway, _Companion Species Manifesto_ , 14–15. 46. Haraway, _Companion Species Manifesto_ , 12. Haraway distinguishes 'companion species' from 'companion animals', arguing that the term 'companion species' should be used for 'nonhuman animals with whom we are not directly related by physical proximity but are nevertheless in significant contact with'. Ibid., 13. 47. Ibid., 16. 48. Ibid., 24. See also Jane Bennett's arguments in her discussion of the implications of being an animal for the concept of politics in her book _Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things_ (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), and more recently in her chapter, 'Animality and Political Theory', in the volume _Social Justice in the Age of Austerity_ , ed