She Annoys Me Greatly". [6] The record does not show how that evidence was to be presented to the jury. A "fair summary" of the evidence, not a narrative of the evidence, is required. [7] As the court noted in State v. LaChappelle, supra, at 752, "The defendant has no right to demand a partial instruction from the court where the requested instruction includes prejudicial matter not required by the law. Neither does the defendant have the right to dictate to the court his theory of defense." [8] I recognize that the trial court's general definition of malice could have been more detailed. It would have been prudent to have defined "specific intent to kill", "recklessly" and "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life". There was no need to define "malice aforethought". See, State v. White, supra. [9] "The term `malice aforethought' imports premeditation, deliberation, intent to kill, and not the mere intention to do some bodily harm." State v. Pugh, 167 S.C. 368, 167 S.E. 416 (1932). See, also, Gaffney v. State, 127 Ga.App. 69, 192 S.E.2d 554 (1972). [10] If an intentional and unlawful act was the proximate cause of death, a presumption arises that it was done with malice aforethought. State v. White, supra. See, also, State v. Trogdon, supra. [11] As there was evidence of intent to cause death, even an error of fact as to malice is rendered harmless. State v. Trogdon, supra. [12] "What is murder? The murder which the Statute [Code Section 16-11-210] denounces is not common murder; for this is its essential characteristic. Common murder is the killing of another, without premeditation and deliberation. This Statute (Code Section 16-11-210) denounces an entirely different kind of crime." State v. Adams, 223 S.C. 46, 51, 74 S.E.2d 580 (1953). [13] See, supra. [14] The term "malice" means "a condition of the mind." Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979). [15] The trial judge defined "premeditation" in the following words: A premeditated design or purpose to kill a person ordinarily or in due form of law involves more than a mere momentary intent or intent to kill. It is time enough to act with malice if you find that the Defendant, without provocation, shot and killed the deceased. The time necessary to form an intent to kill may be so short that it may be instantaneous. There must be such time as would show deliberation and reflection upon the consequences of your act. No particular time is necessary, if you find that the Defendant at the time of killing, had arrived at a fixed determination to kill the deceased and had weighed in his mind the question of taking human life. An act is done with premeditation when it is done upon the pass of a thought. [16] The trial judge also defined the term "malice aforethought" in the following words: Malice aforethought means the killing was done intentionally and willfully without malice aforethought, the killing of another person, which is done intentionally and with a will to kill without legal justification or excuse or mitigating circumstances; it also means the killing is done with deliberate and premeditated malice. [17] Malice and willfulness refer to a state of mind, and express malice involves an intention to kill and refers to the intent of the person doing the killing. Willfulness includes an intentional doing of the act with a conscious disregard of the known facts which might produce death. Willfulness is the deliberate doing of an act by one knowing that he is doing it, without authority, objection or justification. A willfully reckless or wanton disregard of the safety of others imports something more than a mere mistake, or lack of attention, on the part of the defendant. The test of a willful act is not the motive for which it was done, but the fact that there was a definite intent to kill, not an intent to do a certain act and then fall in such an accidental way as to cause death. Malice may be express or implied. Malice is express when there is manifested an intention to take life without legal cause or excuse. Malice is implied when there is no such manifestation but where an act which caused the death of another was done so recklessly and wantonly under existing circumstances as to evince a depraved mind and disregard for human life. Malice may be implied where the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. See, State v. Adams, supra, and State v. Pugh, supra. [18] Under the instructions, the jury was required to find more than a mere intent to inflict physical harm before finding malice aforethought; it had to find that appellant intended to kill. See, State v. Burriss, 246 S.C. 470, 144 S.E.2d 258 (1965). [19] Appellant took the stand and testified that he shot his brother-in-law in order to get him out of the house so that he could help defendant get away from what was happening inside. Thus, the jury could find that he acted in self-defense. He testified that he told his sister he shot his brother-in-law because he would not leave his wife alone and she was still in the house, and that the son of the woman was still there too. He claimed he thought the woman was trying to hit him, so he grabbed the gun from the back of his shorts and it fired accidentally while he was backing away. He testified he had no recollection of anything which happened when he fired the gun, and that he did not intend to hit anyone. "It is error to instruct on the law of self-defense where there is no issue with respect thereto and the facts do not justify an instruction thereon." State v. Peeples, 301 S.C. 19, 389 S.E.2d 653 (1990). This issue was also not raised by appellant in his motion for a new trial. [20] Appellant's reliance on State v. Burkhart, 361 S.C. 370, 605 S.E.2d 555 (2004) is misplaced. In Burkhart, the trial judge refused to charge the jury on self-defense because the appellant was carrying the murder weapon, as a result of the murder. Here, the issue is whether self-defense has been raised by evidence sufficient to warrant an instruction on the issue of self-defense in the first place. The evidence here did not support such a charge. The trial judge did not charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide. The issue of voluntary manslaughter was presented to the jury by appellant's request for the lesser included charge. State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984). No such charge was given. The issue of criminally negligent homicide was not presented to the jury. [21] "The duty of the trial judge is to declare the law as it is clearly defined in the cases, and to instruct the jury as to the legal principles to be applied in their deliberations." State v. Adams, supra. This was done here. The majority's attempt to distinguish this case from that one is futile. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the conviction. BEATTY, J., concurs. NOTES [1] Mr. Brazell's name is listed as "Brazel" in some cases in the record.