Sweepstakes and Gambling Promotion Act, Pub. L. 86-176, 49 Stat. 322, and as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1171 et seq., 15 U. S. C. § 1172, 15 U. S. C. § 1173, which prohibit the advertising or promotion of gambling through interstate media. Since the present litigation involves no gambling devices and is not within the scope of this legislation, we need not consider its constitutionality. See United States v. Shubert, 348 U. S. 222 (1955); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22 (1953); Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exchange, 358 U. S. 153 (1958). [3] Ante, at 703-705. The Court acknowledges that some governmental interests (the promotion of tourism, education, or family values, for example) would be served by advertising that promoted those purposes. Ante, at 705. But the Court dismisses this observation by saying that "nothing in [my] opinion [that advertising is not protected] depends upon such conjectural rationales." Ibid. If so, then it must surely follow that it is the content of the speech that may be promoted, not the governmental interests that may be served by such speech. If advertising may be restricted because it promotes gambling, is in fact gambling, or does not promote a legitimate governmental interest, there is no sound basis for preventing the suppression of political advocacy if the government determines that its interests are served by such advocacy. See United States v. O'Brien, supra, at 383; Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969). And of course such advertising may be prohibited without violating the First Amendment if it falls within one of the narrowly drawn categories of unprotected speech, which have consistently been permitted by this Court to protect otherwise protected speech. See, e. g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). [4] The Solicitor General argues that the Federal Government may also properly restrict its commercial advertising on the basis of its authority to protect the national defense. However, the Federal Government does not maintain the same authority as the States in this area. Thus, the only governmental interests the Federal Government may advance are the promotion of national defense and foreign policy, and these interests are clearly furthered by the restrictions placed on commercial advertising. Furthermore, the Federal Government's interests in the restriction of such advertising can be served as effectively by the content-neutral advertising restrictions upheld today, as by the ban on advertising which the Court rejects. [5] A plurality of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also concluded that, because advertising was not protected, the Government was not obligated to demonstrate that its objectives could not be adequately served by less restrictive means. See 514 F.2d, at 886-887. See also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 506-507, n. 8 (plurality opinion); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U. S. 557, 564-572 (1980). In Metromedia, a plurality of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also took this position. 453 U. S., at 510-511. The decision that advertising is not protected by the First Amendment, however, is not sufficient to justify the total suppression of commercial advertising. Therefore, once it has been determined that advertising is not protected, the advertiser must be permitted to proceed by demonstration that the provisions of the Act at issue will in fact achieve the governmental interest in question. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, supra, at 564-572; see In re R. M. J., supra, at 913. The Government must also show that its restriction on commercial speech is no more extensive than necessary to serve the proffered interests. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, supra, at 566; In re R. M. J., supra, at 916-917. [6] It is somewhat startling to suggest that there is anything of value to the consumer in such advertising. [7] At least in the commercial advertising of noncontraband items of merchandise, such as those subject to the Act, it is not only irrational to assume that consumers prefer advertising over reality, but there is a good deal of contrary evidence as to how consumers prefer to make purchasing decisions. As I wrote more than a decade ago: "We find it hard to believe that, without the benefit of studies, the Court can conclude that advertising will induce the public to buy goods that are either not worth the price or not as safe as they should be. If there were studies or other evidence indicating that the typical consumer had a strong preference for buying a given product simply because it had an attractive label, such information would be relevant to determining whether the advertising of that product would serve the same consumer interest in purchase as the advertising of some other product. . . . Where no such evidence of consumer preference exists, however, it is irrational to assume that consumers will be induced to purchase a product merely by virtue of its attractive label or price, or that the consumer who does buy such a product is thereby harmed. "The question before the Court is not whether regulation of advertising in the public interest is permissible, but what is permissible: whether such regulation, for instance, by a restriction on the number and location of billboards, can be justified under the Constitution by the theory that it serves the public interest. For it is simply irrational to equate the interests which this Act seeks to protect—the interests of manufacturers in avoiding liability for the consequences of defects in their products, and the interests of persons injured by such defects—with the interest of the general public in not being subjected to excessive and possibly misleading claims of product superiority. The interests of the consumer in safety, information and economic efficiency, and those of the seller, are equally significant. To be sure, advertising claims, especially those of long standing, play a major role in the perpetuation of erroneous conceptions of product value. The problem, however, is not merely one of economic costs and benefits. Where significant substantive considerations, such as health and safety, are involved, the public's interest in avoiding costly error may well be deemed to outweigh the manufacturer's interest in disseminating incomplete or misleading information. See [Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 123, 127-128 (1980).] For when the risk that product claims are false or misleading is significant, and purchasers have little knowledge of the true facts, advertising is actually counterproductive and, in any event, has only a tenuous connection to actual consumer demand for the product. Id., at 128-129. The Court has long recognized that the prevention of consumer fraud may justify regulations of advertising which might otherwise violate the First Amendment. But `to sustain the restriction in this case [would require the Court to ignore the fact that] it is far from clear that the advertising practices here at issue are either fraudulent or even deceptive.' Id., at 132. As we held in Central Hudson, the government's legitimate concern with consumer fraud may be adequately served by more directly targeted and less restrictive means than an abridgment of commercial speech." Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771-774 (1976) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted). See also G. B. Smith v. Berry, 181 Va. 668, 25 S. E. 2d 249 (1943) (Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. was decided after a trial on the merits). [8] In addition, this rationale is inapplicable to the products with which the advertising restriction is concerned because the Government itself has no practical way of insuring that these products are actually made of safe materials. See Cippolone v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., supra, at 370-371; Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., supra, at 773-774 (dissenting opinion). [9] See Cippolone v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., supra, at 370-371. [10] See Cippolone v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., supra, at 370-371; Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., supra, at 771-774 (dissenting opinion). [11] The Court suggests that there is no reason to assume that advertising would not include the information provided by label directions. Ante, at 712, n. 28. Of course, such information cannot itself be considered false or deceptive, and consumers cannot be compelled to request the label directions, since it is the product manufacturer which prepares the instructions and provides them to the distributor of the product. Nor is it reasonable to require that the consumer have the "technical understanding" of the manufacturer or distributor to make intelligent use of label instructions. Ante, at 713-714, n. 30. [12] The only practical way for the Government to ensure that consumers make intelligent use of the information that is required to be provided by the label is to require that the consumer rely on the label, which, the Court concludes, is an adequate safeguard. Ante, at 712-713