FTL, LTL, and Long Haul Trucking. The other carrier's name, GRTA, is not available on the Moyes website. *1345 ANALYSIS The two carrier statutes, 49 U.S.C. § 10902(d) and § 14102, permit a carrier to transport goods by motor vehicle only if it has a certificate issued by the FMCSA to do so. 49 U.S.C. § 13902(a)(1) prohibits a carrier from delivering goods by motor vehicle if it has not obtained a certificate. 49 U.S.C. § 10902(d)(2) requires that an application for a certificate, "specify[ ] the nature of the service proposed to be rendered" and "be accompanied by evidence that the carrier has the equipment necessary to provide the service and an operating authority from the appropriate State commission." The application must also specify "whether the carrier will provide service within all or part of the State where the motor carrier is seeking operating authority." 49 U.S.C. § 10902(d)(2)(C)(ii). An application "must contain the carrier's name, if any, the type of service proposed, and such additional information as the Secretary prescribes by regulation." 49 U.S.C. § 10902(d)(2)(C)(i). In addition, when there is an "actual and immediate" or imminent likelihood that goods will be transported without a certificate, 49 U.S.C. § 14102(a) directs that "the person in control of the motor vehicle which is transporting the goods shall cause the cargo to be off-loaded and the shipping documents or the bill of lading or equivalent contract to be surrendered to an appropriate official of the [FMCSA]." 49 U.S.C. § 14102(a). If the carrier fails to surrender the bill of lading, the carrier is subject to fines and enforcement of injunctive relief. 49 U.S.C. § 14104(b)(1). The carrier is also subject to criminal sanctions if its identity cannot be determined. 49 U.S.C. § 14108(a)(1). A grant of summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the Court views the evidence and factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947). The moving party "has the burden of `showing' that it is entitled to summary judgment." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.2000). Once a movant satisfies this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant to "produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 1107 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted). The non-moving party cannot rest on mere allegations or denials, but must instead show that there are issues of fact which "may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505) (internal quotations omitted). B. Interstate Commerce: The Parties' Arguments A threshold question in this case is whether the carriers are engaged in interstate commerce, a question that is separate from the definition of motor private carrier under the FMCSA. The Carriers argue that the only evidence that Plaintiffs have presented that Moyes owns or controls any of the disputed trailers is the Certificate of Title, the Assignment of Liens, and an Invoice from Moyes to GRTA.[1] The Carriers contend that there is no evidence that the alleged trailers *1346 were operated in interstate commerce, and there is no proof that they were owned by Moyes or controlled by it.[2] In response, Plaintiffs contend that there is evidence in the record that some trailers may have been used for the interstate transportation of goods. Plaintiffs submitted the declarations of Moyes Trucking employee David Gatlin and a woman who rented the trailers from Moyes. Moyes responds that these declarations do not provide evidence that the trailers were used in interstate commerce. Moyes cites to testimony from its employees to the effect that none of its customers have had any history of hauling goods in interstate commerce.[3] Further, Moyes points to testimony from Mr. Gatlin that all of Moyes's trailers are used for intrastate hauling only and that Moyes does not have trailers that are capable of hauling goods across state lines.[4] Moyes further argues that any presumption that it is an interstate carrier is rebutted by Plaintiffs' allegations that Moyes's business operations are limited to intrastate transportation and use of leased trucking equipment. This evidence demonstrates, argues Moyes, that Moyes is merely an intrastate motor carrier whose trucking activities take place exclusively within Nevada and therefore outside of the scope of the Motor Carrier Act. Even if the Court found that Moyes owns or controls the subject trailers, the Carriers argue that they do not engage in "private carriage" as the term is used in the FMCSA. Rather, because Moyes is engaged in interstate commerce, Moyes's vehicles are subject to ICC regulations. 1. Applicability of the FMCSA Regulations to Interstate Commerce The Carriers argue that the FMCSA is inapplicable to Moyes because its trucks are operated in interstate commerce, a fact that Plaintiffs have not disputed. It is well established that the FMCSA applies only to interstate transportation and interstate movements of goods.[5]See, e.g., *1347 Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.L. 96-296, § 3(a) 93 Stat. 921 (1980);[6]S.Rep. No. 95-989 at 3-4 (stating that the FMCSA requires motor carriers to "have in effect a currently effective certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission which authorizes the motor carrier to provide specified services."), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3009, 3011. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Moyes's trucks are engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore that the FMCSA does not apply to Moyes. 2. Applicability of the MMC Regulations to Interstate Commerce The Carriers argue that even if the trailers are used for interstate transport, they are not subject to the FMCSA, as the FMCSA only regulates private carriage, not public carriage. Instead, Plaintiffs' activities must be measured under the Motor Carrier Act, which regulates public carriers and exempts vehicles owned by authorized motor carriers from state regulation.[7] *1348 C. Public Carrier Under the FMCSA: Motor Carrier Act Versus MMC Regulations 1. The "Act" Versus the "Regulations" The FMCSA prohibits a person from engaging in the business of transporting property by motor vehicle without having been granted authority by the FMCSA to do so. 49 U.S.C. § 13902(a). A person must apply for a certificate to be issued by the FMCSA in order to engage in the business of transporting property by motor vehicle. 49 U.S.C. § 13902(d). In contrast, the MMC Regulations address the requirements for transporting property by "carriers" and apply to all transportation by motor vehicle, including motor carriers transporting property for their own account. 49 C.F.R. § 390.5. According to Moyes, "[i]n order to be exempt from the FMCSA regulations, and subject to only the [MMC Regulations], it is essential that the carrier own, lease, lease-purchase, or be the beneficial owner of the trailers, cargo and drivers involved in the movement of property." Therefore, the Carriers argue, under 49 C.F.R. § 390.5, it is necessary that a carrier own, lease, lease-purchase, or be the beneficial owner of the equipment, as well as be in actual or constructive possession and control of it. Section 14102(a) of the FMCSA prohibits a carrier from transporting property unless there is an "actual and immediate" or imminent likelihood that property will be shipped without a certificate. 49 U.S.C. § 14102(a). Section 14102(b) states that if a carrier is engaged in such an activity, the carrier shall surrender the bill of lading or equivalent contract to the carrier when required by a "person in control of the motor vehicle that is transporting the goods." 49 U.S.C. § 14102(b). Section 390.5 of the M