Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 29, 2010.   In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-10-00655-CR Charles James Lehman, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On Appeal from the 177th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1205206   MEMORANDUM OPINION             Charles James Lehman has failed to pay the appellate filing fee.  See Tex. R. App. P. 5 (requiring payment of fees in civil cases unless indigent); Order Regarding Fees Charged in Civil Cases in the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals, Misc. Docket No. 12-9246 (Tex. Jul. 16, 2012) (listing fees in court of appeals); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' 3.202(c) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (same).  After being notified that this appeal was subject to dismissal, appellant Charles James Lehman did not adequately respond.  See Tex. R. App. P. 5 (allowing enforcement of rule); 42.3(c) (allowing involuntary dismissal of case).  Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed.              We further order that appellant pay all costs of this appeal.              We further order this decision certified below for observance.                                                                                         PER CURIAM       Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Frost, and Seymore. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).   APPENDIX NOTE   The Clerk’s Record was filed on June 3, 2010. The Reporter’s Record was filed on July 16, 2010.               NUMBER 13-10-00637-CR   In The Court of Appeals For The  Thirteenth District of Texas     NO. 13-10-00637-CR     THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT   V.   CHARLES JAMES LEHMAN, APPELLEE         On Appeal from the 177th District Court  Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1205206   MEMORANDUM OPINION               The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s granting of appellee Charles James Lehman’s motion to suppress. We reverse and remand. Background             Houston police officers responded to a 911 call indicating that a person was waving a gun from his car in the parking lot of an apartment complex.  Officers arrived at the scene at about the same time as Officer C. Rangel, an officer with the Harris County Constable’s Office who was responding to the call of a “woman in a pickup truck driving recklessly.”             Officer Rangel parked his car in front of a Dodge Durango in which he saw three or four people sitting.  Officer Rangel was standing beside the Durango when the windows were lowered and the driver, appellant Charles James Lehman, looked out the window, then yelled “Gun!” before the window went up again.             Officer Rangel drew his weapon and ordered Lehman and his passengers to exit the Durango.  A subsequent search of Lehman’s vehicle yielded a loaded 9mm semi-automatic pistol.  Lehman was arrested.   Motion to Suppress             In a single issue, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting Lehman’s motion to suppress. Standard of Review             We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion.  Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  In so doing, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s findings of historical fact that are supported by the record and to its application of law to fact questions if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.  Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  In this case, the trial court is the sole factfinder, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to its ruling.  Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  We afford almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact when those rulings turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.  Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.  When, as in this case, the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact supporting its ruling, if those findings are supported by the record.  Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).             As the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given their testimony, the trial court was free to believe or disbelieve all or part of the witnesses’ testimony.  State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  We will sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.  Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Analysis             The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the people shall be secure “in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  The corresponding provision of the Texas Constitution states, “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.”  See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9.             Under both federal and state law, an officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is involved in criminal activity.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968); Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492.  “Reasonable suspicion” exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.  Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492.  This objective standard disregards the officer’s subjective intent and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists.  Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).             The first issue in a motion to suppress hearing is the defendant’s initial burden to rebut the presumption of proper police conduct.  Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492.  The burden then shifts to the State to prove the reasonableness of the search or seizure.  Id.  The State can meet this burden by proving that the search or seizure was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.  Id.  Under the totality of the circumstances, the reasonableness of a search or seizure is measured by an objective standard that disregards the officer’s subjective intent and looks solely to whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search or seizure warranted a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.  Brigham v. State, 382 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet.