Proposition betrays all their pretenses, that a nation is formed on the principles of a government, by the choice of the people. The people have indeed made the choice; but it has been made without reason, from a total misconception of the subject. The American constitutions have erected no such extensive and magnificent fabrics as that which has been proposed by this writer. They have done more--they have abolished the state governments, and erected a national one--but the powers of the national legislature have never yet exceeded those of the state legislature. This plan goes to erect one national government, under which all the states are to be entirely swallowed up. By thus governing, what will be the advantage of this union? What is the motive that obliges these men to unite for such distant purposes, and to enter into such extensive engagements? What is it that obliges them to support government at all? To protect the people against a foreign invasion is the whole extent of the business. Against a foreign invasion, the national army and navy is alone competent. The states do not pay into the national treasury; they are not bound in any shape or form to pay any thing to the United States. In what sense, therefore, are they involuntary parties in the transactions of government? If the state legislatures are not only bound, but that they must do everything which the national legislature requires them to do; if the state governments are not only to be bound by the acts of Congress, but that those acts must be executed by the officers of the states; it is impossible that this Congress, or any Congress, should have any power, and that the governments of the states can be made efficient. If the government of the union is to be supreme, and that of the state governments subordinate to it, let us have a direct proof of it. Let us see, if the supremacy of the national government is necessary to give life, energy, and efficacy to the state governments. On the contrary, I see no necessity for such a confederation, or any necessity for governments or parties, because there is a natural right existing in the people which is sufficient to form the government of themselves. The people are perfectly competent, and competent to every thing that relates to their government. They are also under the necessity of exercising the functions of this government; otherwise they must live a state of vassalage. There are certain things which are common to men and nations, and these the people have an equal right to in any manner they may think proper; as to their particular situation and circumstances, they may always alter them, in order to suit their purpose. They may enlarge or abridge their government, and give or take powers in such a manner as to them shall seem best calculated to form them the happiest people on earth. They may change their form of government, whenever it shall be found necessary, or proper to do so. As to external objects, such as defence against an invasion, which at present is the only cause of the existence of governments, the people are equally competent to exercise the government of themselves, without the interposition of any national government whatever. There is no necessity that the people should unite for this purpose, nor that any one should employ others to do this work. It is true that an invasion may be made upon a nation in the midst of its government, and that government may be totally destroyed before the people can unite in defence of it. In such a case, a government may become necessary, and the best way to form it will be to consult the people, in order to discover what is necessary and proper for their defence. If it should be found that the inhabitants of the invaded nation are not capable of or ready to exercise this government, and if they should be unable to make proper application to the powers for their defense, the people in such a case must have recourse to means of defence, which I have before mentioned, and that is to employ the public forces, or to form a provisional government for themselves. The inhabitants of a country, then, in the situation that I have here mentioned, cannot possibly be without a government, because the necessity will force them to be so. They have either public or private means of self-defense, and in either case will make use of these for their own protection. But still it is as true as it is little known to the people that their government will not be oppressive. They will not suffer a military force to exercise the powers of their government, but will have recourse to the old and purest form of government. Whenever they have recourse to such a government, they will have it only for their defence. In this manner, then, the people will form a government for themselves, without any interference of the national legislature; and whenever they have occasion for it, they will use it for their defence, and the people cannot be oppressed or endangered by this provisional government. From these observations, it appears that a state of war, or a war in a state of peace, is not a necessity for the existence of government. It is therefore impossible that a government that is formed by the consent of the people, and for their own defense, should ever become necessary. It is absurd, to suppose that it is ever necessary. The existence of a state of war proves this to be absurd, because it destroys the principle on which all governments are constituted. If it was a natural necessity that government should exist at all, it will exist without any necessity on the part of the people. The people are then under no necessity of providing for their own government; because it is never necessary. There is a necessity for defending the nation from foreign invasion, but there is not a necessity for a government. The people cannot be supposed to be able to defend themselves, unless they are so far acquainted with the affairs of government as to be able to form an adequate government for their own protection. The inhabitants of a country, then, when a foreign invasion is apprehended, must consult the powers of their government to see whether the same is equal to the emergency; for without government they cannot defend themselves. This proves that they are as competent as any other people for providing for their own safety, and it is absurd to say that they are unable to do it, because they have not any government or power to exercise. It is equally absurd to say that the people are under a necessity of constituting a government, and that they are unable to protect themselves without it. It is not necessary that the government should be permanent, nor does a long continuance of any government produce any other effect than to prove that the people have conferred on it a power sufficient to accomplish the end for which it is established; as a nation, it shall continue until this power is abolished by a change of circumstances; if it shall be again abolished by an invasion, the same proofs will make another government necessary, until the nation shall be sufficiently exercised in defence to be able to accomplish all the necessary purposes of government. These observations will also apply to a situation that might arise in any number of individuals, as in case a small number of people were to be attacked by an enemy in any of the situations here mentioned, and were to be unable to defend themselves, it would be necessary that others should come to their assistance, and that in the mean time they should be united by some mutual engagements and arrangements, to secure their rights. A state of war is therefore no more a necessary event in the operation of government than it is in the affairs of individuals. When this constitution is proposed to the people of this country, they will of course take time for reflection and examination. The powers of government are proposed to be unlimited; and no distinction will be made between the powers of government and the rights of citizens. The people are never more disposed to exercise the right of remonstrance, and it must be exercised at the very first onset. Every exercise of power that is not founded on the common right of all, must be in opposition to it. Nothing but universal consent can support it, and this will never be obtained, for it is not a right which governments are inclined to concede. I believe that there are few who will object to the idea of government, or doubt that such as it is, ought to exist in the world. The object of government is to secure the rights of the people, and no other than that; and in this view the constitution is calculated to effect that very purpose, and the people will therefore be disposed to avail themselves of it as soon as they are fairly informed of the advantages they may expect to receive. The great end will be attained, and every man will have the fullest liberty in the conduct of the government, and the most unlimited privileges of acquiring riches. Let me entreat you to consider this matter coolly, and to look at the rights of all men, but more especially at the privileges of America. If we compare the country with any other in Europe we must be convinced that there never was a more suitable country for such an enterprise; and I appeal to America to convince any one who may think otherwise.