Turf Wars_ , _Murder in the Rue Morgue_ , _The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari_ , _Frankenstein_ , _Dracula_ , and _Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde_ in which the protagonist is not a scientist. Such films might have been more common had people been better educated in physics, chemistry, and biology, so that it was more plausible for a scientist to be the director of a movie, for instance. At the same time, these films might not have become so popular if scientific facts were as easily available to the public as they are today.
Perhaps to counteract these changes, scientists are now more likely to be portrayed as bumbling and unintelligent. As _New York Times_ reviewer A. O. Scott put it, if science is not cool it "may have to join forces with Hollywood to save the future from destruction." In other words, scientists are portrayed in a light which is more humorous than other careers, for instance. But this may only give people the wrong idea about science—that it is a bunch of incompetent people.
Science is portrayed in popular culture as both an elite activity and a public good. The popular science fiction novel _2001: A Space Odyssey_ portrays scientists as an elite class that advances human progress while the less educated population remains ignorant. This seems to suggest that progress is dependent upon the contributions of these science-savvy individuals, despite the fact that most of us do not become scientists ourselves.
This view is reinforced in two films released in 2009: _The Day the Earth Stood Still_ and _Inception_. Both movies begin with a group of scientists who are depicted as inept and ignorant. These scientists are portrayed as villains for the problems that they cause: _The Day the Earth Stood Still_ represents aliens as villains who cause destruction because their beliefs are incompatible with our own and _Inception_ portrays dream-sharers as villains for having destroyed the dreams of one of the protagonists. While these films give scientists the characteristics of ignorant, unethical, and power hungry people, their true motives and the actual workings of science are not explored. In short, while the movies reveal that science can be represented in a positive light, they do not show how it is done.
Science fiction shows how science affects popular culture and vice versa, but science is used in television dramas, films, and sitcoms to explore the lives of individuals more than to inform and change society as a whole. The characters in _Friends_ may go through dramatic, often negative experiences because of their failure to deal with the issues raised by their decisions. Yet the overall effect of these decisions is positive, and the characters end up learning something from their experiences—either through character development or through the humor that is created by the events. Although scientists are often portrayed as villains, these individuals are usually at least sympathetic and complex, in a way that makes them more realistic, and therefore more interesting, than the stereotypical characters found in most other films.
**REFERENCES**
Baker, J. (2007). _Science Fiction Cinema: From Outerspace to Cyberspace_. New York: Wallflower Press.
Callenbach, J. (1985). _Ecotopia: The Notebooks and Reports of Lady MacBeth_. New York: Bantam.
Gould, S. J. (1985). _The Mismeasure of Man_. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Nye, A. (1997). _The Future as a Way of Thinking: New Dimensions in the Politics of Human Affairs_. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
**10**
**Science in Medicine**
**CHRISTOPHER KLEIN**
One can scarcely imagine scientists without medicine. Whether one thinks of the sick as "others" or as "us," they've always been an interesting phenomenon: "the poor in spirit," the "infirm," the "impoverished of intellect," the "indolent," the "malingering." We might think of people who make their living, even their fame, from these qualities. We might think of them as the most typical sort of scientists, since their work involves _talking_ about disease or _experimenting_ with human beings—the essence of the scientific enterprise. They, more than anyone else, may remind us of the fact that a science is by nature an enterprise for _interfering_ with nature.1
Or perhaps we should think about scientists in medicine as a way of bringing their work, the _methodology_ of their work, to bear on our lives. At one extreme, that can be medical _chemistry_ and medical _technology_ , which can change our moods and our days and nights. At another, it can be medical _research_ , which can help us better to live or prevent us from dying.
And perhaps scientists in medicine are _human_ , and that counts for something. One might say that we are _social_ beings: the social construction of the world of life and of the self are inextricably bound up with human interaction. The notion of the social construction of what it means to be ill seems like a strange and fascinating idea. As a lay person, I suspect I wouldn't have picked up the term _social construction_ had I not seen it used in the study of illnesses such as Parkinson's disease and Alzheimer's disease.
Medical scientists are concerned with the _human_ side of illness. This gives one reason to believe that scientists in medicine stand a better chance of taking into account a more complete set of circumstances than medical technology or medical science alone. (I want to make an important distinction between _all_ medical scientists and _medical_ scientists, a distinction that is worth mentioning, since all medical scientists do not _necessarily_ address their attention to the same sorts of questions or problems.) Medical scientists are concerned with _us_ , and, thus, it might not seem an especially significant point that science in medicine has been closely associated with medical technology and especially with such technological innovations as anesthetics, antibiotics, and vaccines. Yet it is exactly the point, I think.
To be a medical scientist is to be what the ancient Greeks thought of as a _physician_ , a physician who is a person who engages in _practical_ medical activity. But such a position is one of great subtlety and irony. To be a medical scientist is to be _society's_ doctor. But here is where I think the "irony" comes in: our notion of a doctor has nothing to do with what is best for us, which can mean that those physicians who are well meaning, perhaps, can do the most harm to us. The irony of medicine has to do with the fact that the doctor's job, in fact, consists of treating us for symptoms that often take an extended period of time to develop. Medicine is a profession in which the doctor helps us to deal with our physical and emotional distress by setting it aside, or at least pretending not to notice it. A certain level of ignorance of what we may be experiencing, for instance, is required in order for a patient to remain happy with her doctor.
And yet, when one steps back and looks at this notion of medical science, one can see why it is that the scientist wants to put us at ease. He's probably going to put us at ease: the physician and the scientist can play similar roles in this social game. If he's a good doctor, he will, again, take the symptoms from us without making an effort to inquire into them. He is not going to examine us—he is going to set us aside, because our concerns are so strange, or so unpleasant, or so unutterably boring. The physician needs to think he can find relief in that attitude: there's a lot of work that must go into convincing patients that they really can be relieved of their suffering. And he has every reason to believe that he cannot and will not succeed.
There is an interesting paradox in the medical situation, and it's the same paradox that makes a case for a more _general_ scientific method. The paradox has to do with how the doctor must act if he is not going to be held responsible for his diagnoses and treatments, but must be acting on the basis of information he does not necessarily share with his patients.2 His position is paradoxical because he has to pretend that the sick person is better, in some important sense, _before_ he will have enough information for him to know what she needs. Her illness is a fact, but so is the fact that the diagnosis of the illness can only be understood by means of a certain scientific methodology. In other words, if we understand something medically—for instance, that someone is depressed—we have some sense that we can cure the illness. We don't have any sense that we can cure a patient, even though we should. If a doctor has a good idea of what's wrong with his patient, he may have enough information to get the diagnosis, but then he must explain to the patient that he will treat her as if she were healthy. That's what physicians mean when they say to the patient, "you look great." That's also what patients need to hear.
When we understand how illness develops in a specific context and at a certain point in time—and as a result we might want to take certain actions—we will think of science as both an _activity_ and a _system_ , both a set of theories and something
