I Wanna See If I Can Make a Deal?". We find that the plaintiff and the defendant, as well as the officers, directors, and stockholders of each corporation, are closely associated in business and otherwise, with the two corporations having their principal place of business in this state, that the plaintiff and the defendant are individually and jointly interested financially in each of these corporations, that they are in competition with each other, and that each of the corporations carries out and performs the same or similar functions in the industry in which they are engaged. These circumstances lend credence to the allegation in the affidavit for the order to show cause that "plaintiff has used a `drumming-up' * * * method of doing business and securing corporate business * * * to the end that a rival dealer could not come into business in competition with the defendant at Pocomoke City and thereby take business away from the defendant's business." The plaintiff contends, as the Chancellor held, that the facts do not show that he has been guilty of unfair or deceptive trade practices, and that there is no actual evidence to support the allegations of the complaint. *320 Under the facts alleged, we are of opinion that a prima facie case has been established in favor of the plaintiff. Section 3 of the Act of April 26, 1945, provides in part that "Any act or practice which, at the time it is performed, constitutes a violation of any provision of Sections [5]1, [5]2 or [5]3 may be enjoined in a civil action in the name of the state by the attorney general, or by the aggrieved person or persons." The defendant is entitled to be heard as to whether the acts and practices in question constitute unfair competition. This question is to be determined by the facts and circumstances surrounding each transaction as they existed in each case. If a prima facie case is made out by the pleadings and affidavits, as we hold it was here, then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the acts complained of did not constitute unfair competition within the meaning of the Act. It is this burden, and the burden only, which was placed upon the defendant in the Chancery Court. The defendant is not entitled to a hearing on the question of unfair competition until a prima facie case has been established, because the Chancery Court is confined to the record before it in the absence of any showing of facts that were not before it. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the case remanded to that Court for further proceedings according to law. Reversed. BROWN, LAWSON and STUKES, JJ., and LITTLETON, Acting Associate Justice, concur.