Transferable Life-insurance policies, including those taken out on their lives, were prohibited during the Qing dynasty, but they were widespread in Western Europe and the US at the time. The death of a child might cause loss of inheritance to other family members. These risks were typically spread by a network of intermediaries, known as *kejis*, who had a vested interest in perpetuating the custom. In many cases this meant selling the policies after death, often to unsuspecting Chinese immigrants and even to people in prison. The consequences were the creation of the debt bondage of *hakka* or Coolie immigrants, who were often shipped to overseas colonies like Cuba or the United States where they died without their debt being repaid. The Chinese practice of child adoption as a means of keeping the family lineage continued for some time, until 1949, when it was outlawed by the revolutionary communist regime, resulting in the abandonment of tens of thousands of Chinese children. During the Great Leap Forward (1958--62) -- a massive industrialization and collectivization program -- many more adopted children were killed. During this time a 'family planning apparatus' was established, and the 'birth' of an infertile child was often considered to be a blessing (Shaanxi xinjia wenhua lingdao yuan liyi jiaoyu 陜西信教靈嶼原理總會語餘文編述編續) from the government. From 1967 onwards (see *ibid*), policies of *hukou* (household registration) and *liaojiaoyu* (family planning) limited the movement of 'barefoot' people into major cities. Because *hukou* was connected to an urban household registration system, rural populations were 'locked in' to the *guoying* hukou of their birthplace. The birth of a child did not automatically confer the *hukou* of his or her parents, which is similar to the situation in China today. Since 2002 a new policy called the 'coupon *hukou*' (*furenhukou*), was introduced to reduce household registration bias against migrants from rural areas. However, this does not mean that this population is legally permitted to stay in the city if their *hukou* expires. *Du shi tongzhi* (see [@bib20]: *Tongzhi congshu*) and [@bib51] (*Duliu yuwen*). [@bib40] estimates that the number of orphaned children who migrated to Taiwan by the end of the war was 80,000. See [@bib5]: *Migration as a survival strategy: an anthropological study of Vietnamese refugees*, p. 25) These individuals or groups were also known as 'Chinese', 'the Han' or 'the Chinese People'. [@bib9]: *Sociological theory and research*, p. 155) argues that the term 'ethnic group' should not be used in order to avoid suggesting the ethnic group should be homogeneous. Instead the term 'ethno-nationalist' should be used to differentiate between ethnic groups and nationalists. [^1]: Tel.: +86-28-867-6158. [^2]: . [^3]: Many observers have noted that the term 'nationalism' should not be used to describe a form of movement that is not nationalist in character. When the People's Republic of China was founded, a 'nationalistic' struggle was in progress between advocates of the Russian 'national principle' and Japanese 'empire'. This conflict extended to those who believed in the *minzu* principle and who advocated the formation of a Republic of China (not the ROC, the present day ROC). These struggles were sometimes so intense that China's rulers would persecute people (sometimes to the point of death) simply on the basis of their ideological differences ([@bib9]: 155--6). This suggests that while Chinese nationalism was not invented in the twentieth century, it was certainly greatly intensified. [^4]: [@bib44]: *Warlord Politics and Chinese State-Building*, p. 22). [^5]: Chinese communist elites frequently appealed to a long history of non-elites in China working together as one to justify the existence of the regime and the state. This argument has its roots in Gellner's notion of the 'tribalization' of politics, the process through which any kind of unity between citizens becomes a 'we', leading them to feel the necessity of unifying behind an ideology. In other words, 'we' have become a political 'people'. [^6]: [@bib5]: *Migration as a survival strategy*, p. 22). [^7]: [@bib47] shows that the *tulou* type is only present in the south. Furthermore, this type of building developed outside the traditional city hierarchy. Whereas in a modern metropolis it would have been located at the very bottom, here it was in a position midway down the scale. According to [@bib35] (1927), these two facts led him to conclude that the ancient *tulou* must have been built for people other than Han Chinese. [@bib31]: 33--4) agrees with Wang on the cultural distinction between the two types of building, but explains the emergence of the 'tulou' tradition in this way: 'Because in most of the plain areas where they built the *tulou*, no single people could have ruled, and no single political system had been established there, the inhabitants of these areas became relatively autonomous. In addition, they developed a distinctive culture, a style of building, a music, and a literature.' [@bib35] (1927) sees a difference between the two kinds of fortresses in the type of stone used for their construction: the 'tulou' tended to be constructed out of a type of stone called 'black stone' (黑石). [@bib2]: *Studies in Chinese Architecture*, p. 39) calls this stone, 'a type of fine-grained igneous rock, which has a uniform brown colour, and the grains are cemented by an iron carbonate. It is, in fact, a very hard kind of stone; this explains why *tulou* were constructed of black stone which was difficult to quarry, and why they used wood for the framework'. [^8]: [@bib11]: *Chinese Bureaucracy in Crisis*, p. 16). [^9]: [@bib6]: *Patrons and Protectors*. [^10]: [@bib7] ([@bib7]: *Sons of the Yellow Emperor: the making of China's first hegemons*, p. 18). [^11]: [@bib47]: *Tulou*: *Essays on the Social Life of Lijiang*, p. 32). [^12]: [@bib31]: *Tulou: A study of a Chinese rural fortress*, p. 7). [^13]: The population of the *guowang* and *huji* areas was relatively small, but it consisted of a much wider population than the Han nationality, and as such, was seen as undesirable. Consequently, the Han nationality were not permitted to reside in this area ([@bib46]: *Zang shouzhe de shenghuo -- shishou shiye niandai chengzhen huanze de chengshi jiqi chongxin -- guowang shi qiye zhishi zhengquan* \[*The Lives of the Censors -- on a History of the Han people in Lijiang -- How the Censors in Lijiang View the Area near the Huji and Guowang.*\], pp. 11--12). [^14]: [@bib47] ([@